University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy
Volume 32

Issue 1

Article 5

2021

Conserving the Future: Policing Syndicated Conservation
Easements
J.W. Glass

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp

Recommended Citation
Glass, J.W. (2021) "Conserving the Future: Policing Syndicated Conservation Easements," University of
Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy: Vol. 32: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp/vol32/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

CONSERVING THE FUTURE: POLICING SYNDICATED

CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
J. W Glass*
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................

I.

THE RISE OF SYNDICATED CONSERVATION EASEMENTS ........

II.

THE CURRENT STATE OF SYNDICATED CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS ............................................................................

A.
B.
III.

133
135

142
Belair Woods, LLC v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue ..... 144
United States v. EcoVest Capital Inc ............................ 146

THE (POSSIBLE) FALL OF SYNDICATED CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS ............................................................................

149

CONCLUSION.........................................................................................155
INTRODUCTION

"What ...

a sale of dead souls?"

"

"Oh no," said Tchitchikov, "we shall write them as living,
just as it actually stands in the census list. It is my habit never
to depart one jot from the law.. ..
"... will not this negotiation be inconsistent with civic code
and the ultimate welfare of Russia?"'
Discussions of abusive tax scams conjure visions of offshore bank
accounts, fake charities, and phishing schemes. 2 Yet, it may be surprising
to learn that the noble goals of charitable conservation have been
subverted to cost the U.S. Government an estimated $3.2 billion dollars
in tax revenue yearly. 3 Conservation easements are statutory creations
which construct an enforceable, assignable negative easement in gross to
be donated to a charitable organization or government entity in
perpetuity. 4 Historically, conservation easements have been important
* J.W. Glass earned his J.D. from The University of Florida in 2021 and now works at
the Center for Biological Diversity. He thanks his wife Victoria and his son Clark for their support.
1. NIKOLAI GOGOL, DEAD SouLs 35 (Constance Garnett trans., Barnes & Noble Classics
ed., 2005). Like selling dead serfs for the tax benefits, syndicated conservation easements present
a murky area of law that, despite its potentially abusive purpose of tax theft, may still produce a
net benefit for the conservation.

2. I.R.S. News Release IR-2018-66 (Mar. 21, 2018).
3. Senate Inquiry into Syndicated ConservationEasements, 30 TAX'N EXEMPTS, May-June
2019, at 41.
4. Jessica Owley, The Emergence of Exacted Conservation Easements, 84 NEB. L. REV.

1043, 1085-88 (2005).
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tools to protect natural, historic, or scenic areas while giving owners a
generous tax deduction. 5 In recent years, nonprofits and governments
have used easements for land conservation purposes, with the National
Conservation Easement Database estimating that 191,476 conservation
easements encumber 32,701,848 acres of land. 6
However, conservation partnership, or "syndicated conservation
easements," subvert the goals of conservation by "rely[ing] on a network
of complicit appraisers and even charitable organizations," to overvalue
easements and distribute inflated tax deductions to members of the
partnership, LLC, or S-Corporation.7 Proponents of syndicated
conservation easements argue that they still support the ideology of land
conservation, and should not be subject to additional scrutiny merely
because they purchase via a partnership.8 Yet such a scheme "inspires
contempt for the system of honest, voluntary income tax reporting and
undermines the public's confidence in a deduction designed to encourage
preservation and conservation efforts that is instead being abused" for
financial benefit. 9 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) enforcement and
recent litigation by the Department of Justice (DOJ) have targeted these
partnerships to curb tax theft.1 0 Yet, even proponents of syndicated
conservation easements argue that the underlying issue is overvaluation
of easements, not who purchases them. 1 The income tax benefits that
abusive partnerships provide would not exist but for the conduct of
complicit property appraisers.1 2
This Note addresses the novel legal concept of syndicated
conservation easements, their harm to the goal of conservation, and both
current and novel ways to prosecute syndicated conservation easements
without completely removing the mechanism from the environmentalist's
5. See 26 U.S.C.

§§ 170(b)(1)(E)(i)-ii), (h)(4) (2019).

http://conservationeasement.us
EASEMENT DATABASE,
[https://perma.cc/7ZWU-QGB2] (last visited Mar. 7, 2021); Federico Cheever & Nancy A.
6. NATIONAL

CONSERVATION

McLaughlin, An Introduction to Conservation Easements in the United States: A Simple Concept
and a Complicated Mosaic of Law, 1 J.L. PROP. & SOC'Y 107, 109 (2015); see also Mary Jane
Angelo, Integrating Water Management and Land Use Planning: Uncovering the Missing Link
in the Protection of Florida's Water Resources, 12 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 223, 231 (2001)

(discussing how conservation easements significantly contribute to water resource stewardship by
Water Management Districts).
7. Senate Inquiry into Syndicated Conservation Easements, supra note 3; Bryan Hickman,
Environmental Tax Deduction at Risk Due to Overzealous IRS, NAT'L TAXPAYERS UNION, July

29, 2019, at 1, 2.
8. See generally Hickman, supra note 7.

9. See Complaint at ¶ 169, United States v. EcoVest Capital Inc., No. 1:18-cv-05774-AT
(N.D. Ga. Dec. 18, 2018) (emphasis added).
10. I.R.S. Notice 2017-10, 2017-4 l.R.B. 544; Charitable Conservation Easement Program
Integrity Act of 2019, S. 170, 116th Cong. (2019) [hereinafter CCEPI Act].
11. Hickman, supra note 7, at 2-3.

12. See Complaint, supra note 9, at ¶¶ 19, 90-94.
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toolkit. Instead of scrutinizing conservation efforts, regulation and
litigation should focus on the underlying issue of valuation. While
pending legislation will attempt to impose caps on returns for
partnerships,1 3 the conduct of appraisers is still left unchecked.
Ultimately, revising the current method of regulating appraisers to mirror
a model of cooperative federalism and refocusing litigation to focus
exclusively on the issue of valuation would curb the abuse of
conservation easements.

Part I will consist of a historical and legal review of conservation
easements, their income tax benefits, and the rise of syndicated
conservation easements.' 4 Part II will examine the current regulation and
enforcement of syndicated conservation easements by analyzing IRS
regulation, Tax Court decisions, and pending litigation.1 5 Finally, Part III
will argue that instead of looking directly at the partnerships, the IRS and
state licensing boards should focus on the conduct of appraisers to curb
the abuse of the noble goals of conservation.1 6 In doing so, this Note will
argue that addressing the issue of valuation will curb tax theft while still
allowing for individuals and partnerships alike to invest in conservation.
I. THE RISE OF SYNDICATED CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

A conservation easement is a partial interest in land that is either
voluntarily donated or sold by a landowner. to an IRS-recognized
nonprofit or government agency for the purpose of protecting natural

habitat; open space; or recreational, agricultural, or historic resources.1 7
The term conservation easement, as used to describe private restrictions,
was first coined in 1959 by land-use planner William Whyte to explain
the preservation of open space and environmentally valuable land.1 8 Yet,
widespread easement purchases had already began in the 1930s with the
purchase of open-space easements along the Blue Ridge Parkway by the
National Parks Service.19

13. CCEPI Act, supra note 10.
14. See infra Part

1.

15. See infra Part I.
16. See infra Part Ill.
17. John B. Wright, ConservationEasements:An Analysis ofDonatedDevelopment Rights,

59 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 487, 487 (1993).
18. William H. Whyte, Jr., Securing Open Space for Urban America: Conservation
Easements, 36 URB. LAND. INST. 1, 8 (1959).
19. See John L. Hollingshead, Conservation Easements: A Flexible Tool for Land
Preservation, 3 ENV'T LAw. 319, 333 (1997) ("The primary impetus for the widespread use of
modem conservation easements, however, was the protection of scenic views along highways.
During the 1930s and 1940s, the National Park Service (NPS) purchased conservation easements
... to protect scenic views along the Blue Ridge Parkway."); see also Wright, supra note 17, at

488.
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However, the modern conservation easement is a product of
legislation designed to remedy the ineffective use of the common law
devices of easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes. 2 0 While
real covenants presented a solution for land conservation in contract law,
problems existed as to the enforceability and the burden running with the
land when the burdened party is off site. 2 1 Moreover, easements in gross
were unassignable, meaning they extinguished upon the death of the
owner and presented problems for perpetual conservation. 22 On the other
hand, equitable servitudes did not require privity of estate and seemed
like a likely mechanism to enforce conservation, but authorities differed
whether they could run with the land. 23 In fact, it was this uncertainty in
common law solutions for conservation that led to the widespread
adoption of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA) in 1981.24
The UCEA made land conservation more accessible by eliminating
these common law impediments and creating a broad and flexible
framework for land conservation. 25 Twenty-two states and the District of
Columbia have adopted the UCEA. 26 Additionally, every state except
North Dakota 27 has enacted conservation easement enabling statutes that
are similar the UCEA's provisions. 2 8 These statutes promote long-term
conservation by removing common-law barriers, mandating the
easement's conservation purpose, and requiring that easements be held
by governmental entities or charitable organizations in perpetuity. 29
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Hollingshead, supra note 19, at 325-26, 332-33.
Id. at 330-31.
Id. at 327-28.
Id. at 332.
Id. at 332-33.

25. The UCEA defines "conservation easement" in broad terms as:
a nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing limitations or
affirmative obligations the purposes of which include retaining or protecting
natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property, assuring its availability for
agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources,
maintaining or enhancing air or water quality, or preserving the historical,

architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.
§ 1(1), 12 U.L.A. 170 (1996).
26. Uniform Conservation EasementAct, USLEGAL, https://environmentallaw.uslegal.com
/uniform-laws/uniform-conservation-easement-act/ [https://perma.cc/NH5U-R3GR] (last visited
UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT

Oct. 16, 2019).
27. See Wachter v. Comm'r., 142 T.C. 140 (2014) (holding North Dakota statute banned
the holding of conservation easements in perpetuity, thus failing to meet the requirements of a
qualified conservation contribution); but see N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-05-02.1(2) (North Dakota
law allowing for waterfowl production easements to exist in perpetuity at the negotiation of the
dominant and servient tenement).
28. Nancy A. McLaughlin & Robert W. Swenson, Uniform Conservation Easement Act
Study Committee Background Report, in UTAH L. FAC. SCHOLARSHIP 6 (2018).

29. Id. at 6-7; see, e.g., Fla. Stat.

§ 704.06 (2020).
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Today, conservation easements have emerged as a viable and favored tool
of conservationists. 3 0
Additionally, conservation easements have developed into a source of
lucrative tax deductions for landowners. 3 ' Typically, a donor cannot
receive any tax deduction for donating a mere partial interest in land, such
as an easement.32 In response, Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of
1976, which provided a statutory allowance for the deductibility of
charitable conservation easements. 33 The act amended 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(f)(3) to include "a qualified conservation contribution" as an
exception to the partial interest rule, thus providing a generous tax benefit
for the donation of conservation easements without a donor losing the
entire interest in the land.34 Under section 170, an individual may deduct
up to 50% of the individual's contribution base for the value of the
easement on the land, with 100% annual deduction for farmers and
ranchers.3 5 If the value exceeds the individual's contribution base, they
can carry over the deduction for more than fifteen years. 36 After
uncertainty about the future of this benefit, the conservation easement tax
incentive was made permanent as part of the Congressional budget deal
on December 18, 2015.37 For many, this tax benefit is what inspires their
donation, with the conservation of the land as an ancillary concern.3
Unexpectedly, this generous tax benefit has attracted more than just
conservation-it has attracted the ire of the IRS. 39 Although conservation
easements have always been abused for their tax benefits to some extent,
such abuses were limited to worthless facade easements on historical
property and fanciful preservation of golf courses with no conservation

30. Owley, supranote 4, at 1044.
31. David J. Dietrich, Conservation Easements, 12 PROB. & PROP. 43, 43 (1998) ("Clients
usually grant conservation easements for two reasons: genuine charitable motive to protect
environmentally unique land and desire to obtain a charitable income tax deduction.").
32. Id.; see 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(3) ("Denial of deduction in case of certain contributions of
partial interests in property.").
33. See generally Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).

34. 26 U.S.C.

§ 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) (2019); see also id. at § 170(h)(1) (defining a qualified

conservation contribution as a contribution of a qualified real property interest to a qualified
organization to be used exclusively for conservation purposes).

35. Id. at § 170(b)(1)(E); I.R.S. Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide 35-36
(revised Jan. 24, 2018) [hereinafter Audit Techniques Guide].
36. Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 35, at 36-37.

37. Derrick P. Fellows, Enhanced Conservation Easement Tax Incentive Reinstated Made
Permanent, PRESERVING FOR TOMORROW (Dec. 24, 2015), https://www.preservingfortomorrow
.com/2015/12/enhanced-conservation-easement-tax-incentive-reinstated-made-permanent/#.Xat

2TuhKg2x [https://perma.cc/6NPA-3GK5].
38. See Dietrich, supra note 31, at 48.
39. I.R.S. Notice 2017-10, supra note 10, at 544-45.
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value. 40 However, the common thread is that it was individual entities
committing the abuse, not, as in current cases, partnerships that advertise
to investors the ability to receive eight times the investment in tax breaks
and defend their theft with conservation purposes. 4 ' The current scheme
is as follows:
[T]en investors kick in $100,000 each for an LLC to
purchase for $1 million an entire square mile of cattle
grazing land .... The Promoter then waives his magic wand,
creates a 50-page business plan for the land to become a flyin golf club, and the property magically becomes worth $20
million -- this is determined by a friendly property
appraiser .... An easement to maintain the land as grazing
land is then donated to a charity at the $20 million price,
giving each of the ten investors a $2 million deduction for a
$100,000 investment.4 2
In this example, the actual characteristics of the land did not change,
nor will it change in the future. Yet, somewhere along the way, it became
an abusive tax shelter with the potential to deduct $2 million deductions
to each investor. Such syndicated conservation easements may seem
beneficial on paper, but there is no real substance or motivation to their
preservation purpose. 4 3
In fact, syndicated conservation easements have contributed to the tax
theft of a total of $20 billion.44 Additionally, the top 248 entities claiming
these deductions have absconded with $6 billion in the year 2016 alone. 4 5

40. See e.g., Champions Retreat Golf Founders, LLC v. Comm'r, 116 T.C.M. (CCH) 262
(T.C. 2018) (holding that a golf course had no conservation value for habitat of wildlife, protection
of the nearby national forest, or protection of open space and therefore could not be deducted);

see also Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. P'ship v. Comm'r, 755 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting a
deduction based on a historic facade easement when the best use of the property was grossly
overvalued).
41. S. 170 / HR. 1992, LAND TR. ALLIANCE, https://www.landtrustalliance.org/s-170-hr1992 [https://perma.cc/R298-4HXP] ("[T]he top 10 percent of these transactions enabled
investors to claim, on average, deductions valued at more than eight times the amount of their

original investment.").
42. Jay Adkinsson, The IRS Leaves a Lump of Coalfor Syndicated ConservationEasements
in Notice 2017-10, FORBES (Dec. 27, 2016, 10:56 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jay
adkisson/2016/12/27/the-irs-leaves-a-lump-of-coal-for-syndicated-conservation-easements-in-

notice-2017-10/#53b23e96eb35 [https://permacc/ZL8Z-N98M].
43. Id.
44. Letter from David J. Kautter, Acting Comm'r, I.R.S., to Sen. Ron Wyden (Mar. 20,
2018),

http://s3.amazonaws.com/landtrustalliance.org/IRS-Wyden-letter-3-20-18.pdf

[https://

perma.cc/NZG5-9XXN].
45. Letter from David J. Kautter, Acting Comm'r, I.R.S., to Sen. Orrin Hatch 1 (July 12,

2018), http://s3.amazonaws.com/landtrustalliance.org/IRS-Hatch-letter-7-13-18.pdf
perma.cc/5TW2-NMSQ].

[https://
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The use of these partnerships have exploded in recent years, causing
outcries for regulation of this abusive tax scheme. 4 6
Thus, the IRS issued Notice 2017-10 (Notice) to define and officially
recognize abusive syndicated conservation easements as "tax avoidance"
and therefore subject to required disclosure and maintenance obligations
as a presumed tax shelter, lest they face reporting- and accuracy-related
penalties. 4 7 With the issuance of the Notice, the IRS intended to challenge
the purported tax benefits from syndicated conservation easements based
on overvaluation of the easement. 4 8 Further, the Notice identified eight
elements triggering disclosure: (i) promotional information is provided to
potential investors; (ii) the investment promoted is membership in a passthrough entity; (iii) the pass-through entity owns real property; (iv) the
investors are informed they will receive at least 2.5 times the value of
their initial investment; (v) this representation causes the investment in
the entity; (vi) the pass-through entity contributes a conservation
easement on the land it owns; (vii) the easement generates a charitable
deduction allocated among members in the partnership; and (viii) these
deductions are claimed against the investors taxable income. 4 9 Identified
pass-through entities are made to fill out. Form 8918 (Material Advisor
Disclosure Statements) to disclose any easement transaction purporting
2.5 times the amount invested. 50 With the issuance of the Notice, the IRS
recognized that syndicated conservation easements are suspect enough to
require disclosure and accordingly enforcement. 5 1
Opponents of the Notice argued that it was overly broad and
burdensome, it applied retroactively to 2010, and it did not address the
problem of overvaluation.5 2 Additionally, pro-syndication group The
Partnership for Conservation argued that the requirements imposed by
Form 8886 did not provide the IRS with any additional substantive
information that was not already disclosed in the already required Form
8283 (Appraisal Summary). 53 Moreover, they argued that targeting
conservation easements contravened congressional intent in offering the

46. See Peter Elkind, The Billion-Dollar Loophole, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 20, 2016, 6:30 AM),
https://www.propublicaorg/article/conservation-easements-the-billion-dollar-loophole
[https://
perma.cc/LN2Q-RVD2].
47. I.R.S. Notice 2017-10, supra note 10, at 544-45.
48. Id.
49. Timothy Lindstrom, A Tax Guide to ConservationEasement Syndication, 47 REAL EST.
REV. 2, 6-7 (2018).

50. Id. at 8-13.
51. Lindstrom, supra note 49, at 11.
52. Our Position on IRS Notice 2017-10, P'SH[P FOR CONSERVATION (last visited Oct. 19,
2019), https://partnershipforconservation.org/position-irs-notice-2017-10/
[https://perma cc/5N

HY-G32W].
53. Id.
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tax breaks to foster land preservation. 54 In essence, proponents of
syndication objected that adding further scrutiny on a legitimate form of
land conservation effectively closed the door to participation in
protecting unique lands.5 5 Syndicated conservation easements may even
generate meaningful land conservation that would not have otherwise
occurred, regardless of the intent of the investors to receive the inflated
benefit.56
However, the main opposition argument was that syndicated
conservation easements were essentially tax scams that undermined
confidence in the entire charitable structure of voluntary land
conservation. 57 Further, conservation easement syndication subverted the
public trust in the goals of conservation by financially benefitting
individuals at the expense of the U.S. Treasury. 58 Organizations
supported the Notice as a way to prevent abusive charitable incentive for
profit while still allowing for honest philanthropy and land
conservation. 59 Traditional proponents of conservation, led by the
national conservation organization Land Trust Alliance, argued that
public outrage over bad actors may jeopardize the tax deduction
altogether and give conservationists a bad name. 60
Yet, at the heart of the controversy lies the issue of valuation. 6 1
Partnerships are already required to file an annual return, Form 1065
(U.S. Return of Partnership Income), to report the partnership's income,
deductions, gain, losses, and to report each member's distributive share
to the IRS. 62 As part of the Form 1065, partnerships are required to file a
Form 8283 (Appraisal Summary), which additionally must be signed by
the appraiser and the charitable or government organization to which the

54. Id.
55. We Must Encourage Conservation Efforts, Not Close Doors to Participation, P'SHIP
FOR CONSERVATION, https://partnershipforconservation.org/must-encourage-conservation-efforts

-not-close-doors-participation/ [https://perma.cc/TZC7-Q5R7] (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
56. See Lindstrom, supra note 49, at 5-6 (examining two hypothetical examples of
syndicated conservation-one of them evidently done for conservation, with another that is
clearly abusive).

57. Id. at 3.
58. Complaint, supra note 9 ("Defendants' abusive conservation easement syndication
scheme inspires contempt for the system of honest, voluntary income tax reporting and
undermines the public's confidence in a deduction designed to encourage preservation and

conservation efforts that is instead being abused to financially benefit [individuals] at the expense
of the U.S. Treasury.").
59. Letter from Land Tr. All. et al., to Sens. Steve Daines & Debbie Stabenow (January 18,
2019), http://s3.amazonaws.com/landtrustalliance.org/LetterSupport-S170.pdf [https://perma.cc/

6Y5K-XKZM].
60. Elkind, supra note 46.
61. Lindstrom, supra note 49, at 3.
62. Complaint, supra note 9, at 160.
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conservation easement was donated. 63 However, the appraiser is also
required to prepare a supplemental statement to accompany the Form
8283 including calculations of the cost of the easement.M Since
syndicated conservation easements cannot function without high-value
easement donations, the function of the appraiser is critical to the
continuance of this tax appraisal scheme. 65 Even some conservation
groups have sided with syndicated conservation easement holders in
lobbying for policing the appraisal process rather than the partnerships
on their own.6
Typically, a donor will receive the fair market value (FMV) for their
contribution determined by a qualified appraiser as defined by statute. 6 7
However, calculating the FMV presents a difficulty because the value the
donor is entitled to is not the value of the land itself, but the value of the
easement on the land. Therefore, the FMV of a conservation easement
depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the property. 68 The
best evidence for determining the value of a conservation easement is the
difference in value of the property before and after it is encumbered by
the conservation easement. This difference can be calculated by
determining the values of the uses of the property, the zoning of the
property, and other restrictions, which existed before the easement, and
which may exist after the easement. 69 A qualified appraiser determines
the FMV of the easement by subtracting the before and after value. 70
Yet, while the valuation of the easement is determined by a before and
after method, the appraisal is based on the valuation philosophy of highest
and best use (HBU). 71 The HBU is the reasonable and probable use that
will support the highest value for the property at the time of the
appraisal. 72 Generally, this includes the most profitable, likely, and legal
use for a property. 73 The HBU must further satisfy four valuation criteria:
63. Id at ¶61(k); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13I(4)(iv)(G) (2020).
64. Complaint, supra note 9, at ¶ 61(k).
65. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2019-47 (Mar. 19, 2019).
66. Elkind, supra note 46.
67. Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 35, at 42; see Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-11(2) (2020)
("The fair market value is the price at which the property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."); see IRC § 170(f)(11)(E)(ii) (defining a qualified
appraiser as one who has earned appraisal designation, regularly performs appraisals, and meets
any other requirements as specified by the Secretary).
68. Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 35, at 42-43; Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i).
69. Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 35, at 43-44; Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii).
70. Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 35, at 43.

71. Id. at 46.
72. LAND TR. ALL. & NAT'L TR. FOR HIST. PRES., APPRAISING EASEMENTS: GUIDELINES FOR
VALUATION OF LAND CONSERVATION AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION
[hereinafter APPRAISING EASEMENTS].

73. Id.

EASEMENTS

16 (1999)
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physical possibility, legal permissibility, financial feasibility, and
maximum productivity.4 To determine the HBU value, three
professionally accepted methods of valuation are employed by
appraisers-the comparable sales approach, the cost approach, 75 and the
income approach. 76 All three should be employed to determine the FMV
of the easement. 7 7 The comparable sales approach involves the direct
comparison with recently sold properties in the general area to determine
a market value. 78 While this approach is generally considered the most
reliable, syndicated conservation easement partnerships sometimes
ignore the data for comparable sales. 79 Instead, appraisers favor the
income approach, which provides an indication of value by focusing on
the income that the property could generate had it not been encumbered
by the easement. 80 However, appraisers tend to misapply the viability of
this approach, ignore relevant recent sales, and typically use false
assumptions about the actual use of the property. 8 1 Ultimately, appraisers
hold the power to generate tax deductions, and thus are the driving force
behind the entire scheme of syndicated conservation easements.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF SYNDICATED CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

Although the purpose of the Notice was to create a mechanism to
completely halt and prosecute abusive tax schemes, the effect of the
Notice has been delayed and widely criticized as ineffective. 8 2 Originally,
persons engaged in syndicated conservation were required to submit
documents disclosing their participation to the IRS Office of Tax Shelter
Analysis by May 1, 2017.83 Material advisors, like appraisers, were
required to file mandatory disclosures of documents on or before May 1,
2017.84 However, in response to "requests for additional time," the IRS
extended the due date under Notice 2017-23 for participants to October
2, 2017, but neglected to include appraisers. 85 In response to the effects
of hurricane damage, the IRS extended the due date yet again with Notice
74. Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 35, at 46.
75. Cost approach is typically used for property with new buildings or important historic
conservation easements on them and is generally inappropriate for vacant land like that to be
protected via a conservation easement. APPRAISING EASEMENTS, supra note 72, at 26.

76. Id. at 24.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.; e.g., Complaint, supra note 9, at 1 76.
80. APPRAISING EASEMENTS, supra note 72, at 28; see, e.g., Complaint, supra note 9, at

150.
81. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 9, at
82. Adkisson, supra note 42.

¶¶

76, 150.

83. I.R.S. Notice 2017-10, supra note 10, at 4-5.
84. Id.
85. I.R.S. Notice 2017-29, 2017-20 I.R.B. 1243.

¶

2021]
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2017-58 to October 31, 2017, for any person "whose principal residence
or principal place of business was located in a Hurricane Harvey,
Hurricane Irma, or Hurricane Maria covered disaster area .. . or whose
records necessary to meet the disclosure obligation were maintained in
such a covered disaster area." 86 The IRS routinely allows for extensions
by request, and grants additional limited extensions to taxpayers in
federally declared disaster areas. 87 However, when looking at the purpose
of the Notice as a way to concretely prevent tax avoidance, delays and
uncertainty seemed to undermine a supposed simple way to save the
reputation of conservation easements. 88 Additionally, the Notice was met
with intense resistance from promoters and syndicators which delayed
any actual prosecution. 89
For all its promise, the Notice has been widely cited as a failure by
environmentalists for its inadequacy. 90 Even though their official position
is that the Notice has prevented the promotion and marketing of
syndicated conservation easements, the IRS has only processed 552
Forms 8886 for syndicated conservation easements identified as listed
transactions as of May 21, 2018.91 Additionally, the volume of improper
deductions reported by the IRS after the issuance of the Notice shows the
need for a more varied approach to the issue. 92For one, the IRS usually
only publishes notices listing transactions after receiving input from both
the Senate Finance Committee and the Joint Committee on Taxation. 93
This consultation with financial agents is reflected in the language of the
Notice, which states that the main purpose is to prevent tax avoidance,
not to preserve a conservation mechanism. 94 Thus, despite the Notice's
good intentions, this form of relief tries to remedy an abuse of
environmental issues in the same way an abuse of a tax shelter is handled,
attacking the promotors and participants rather than the mechanism
which let the scheme continue.
86. I.R.S. Notice 2017-58, 201742 I.R.B. 326 ("Taxpayers who believe they are entitled
[to an extension] should mark 'Hurricane Harvey', 'Hurricane Irma', or 'Hurricane Maria' on the
top of their Form 8886 .... ").
87. See Anne Carrns, It's Tax Time Again for the Millions Who Got an Extension, N.Y.

TIMEs (Oct. 11, 2019, updated July 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/11/yourmoney/tax-filing-extension.html [https://perma.cc/7EL2-A649].
88. I.R.S. Notice 2017-10, supra note 10, at 544-45.
89. See Greenberger v. Internal Revenue Serv., 283 F. Supp. 3d 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2017)
(Freedom of Information Act litigation involving an ongoing investigation of syndicated
conservation easements).
90. See Land Tr. All. et al., supra note 59.
91. The 2018 Tax Filing Season and Future IRS Challenges: HearingBefore the S. Comm.
on Fin., 115th Cong. 30 (2018) (statement of David J. Kautter, Acting Comm'r, Internal Revenue
Serv.).
92. Land Tr. All. et al., supra note 59.
93. Adkinsson, supra note 42.
94. I.R.S. Notice 2017-10, supra note 10.
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Recently, there has been a renewed threat of litigation against
promoters and syndicators from the DOJ. 9 5 At the moment, the IRS and
DOJ have begun renewed prosecution of syndicated conservation
easement in the State of Georgia. While Georgia has only 2.5% of the
nation's total land under easement and 1.3% of the nation's land trusts,
about 36% of all federal tax deductions from charitable conversation
easements were from Georgia. 96 With eight of the ten biggest syndicators
located in Georgia, syndication has become an industry with earthfriendly sounding partnerships like EcoVest touting the get-rich-quick
appeal of an infomercial. 97 Thus, it comes as no surprise that two
important cases on syndicated conservation easements are currently
working their way through the court system.98
A. Belair Woods, LLC v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue99
While Belair Woods does not function as a crack-down on syndicated
conservation easements per se, it does represent the renewed scrutiny the
IRS is placing on charitable deductions claimed by partnerships.1 00 In
fact, in an amicus brief, the Land Trust Alliance applauded "the
Commissioner's attempt to end abusive tax shelters that use inflated
conservation easement appraisals to claim excessive charitable
deductions" while approving of the continued policy initiated with
original listing Notice.101
Belair Woods, LLC (Belair), is a Georgia based corporation formed
in late 2008.102 Belair Woods's tax matter partner, Effingham Managers,
LLC, was affiliated with HRH Investments, LLC.10 3 HRH owned a
1,490-acre tract of woodland abutting several properties they had
previously developed.104 HRH meant to develop this land, too, but instead
abandoned it during the Great Recession.1 05 Through two individual
transfers, Belair became the owner of 145.15 acres on this tract of land
95. See generally Belair Woods, LLC v. Comm'r, 116 T.C.M. (CCH) 325 (2018); see also
Complaint, supra note 9; Greenberger v. Internal Revenue Serv., 283 F. Supp. 3d 1354 (N.D. Ga.

2017).
96. ADAM LOONEY, TAX POL'Y CTR., CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS OF CONSERVATION

EASEMENTS 11 (2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/looneyconserv

ationeasements.pdf [https://perma.cc/KXG9-3DZJ].
97. Elkind, supra note 46.
98. See generally Belair Woods, 116 T.C.M. (CCH) 325; Complaint, supra note 9.

99. 116 T.C.M. (CCH) 325 (2018).
100. See generally id.
101. Brief for Land Trust Alliance, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Belair Woods, 116 T.C.M. (CCH) 325 (2018) (No. 19493-17), 2018 WL 6990894, at *3.
102. Belair Woods, 116 T.C.M. (CCH) 325, at 3.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 3-4.

CONSERVING

20211

THE FUTURE

145

shortly after Belair's founding. 0 6 A year later, Belair deeded the land as
a conservation easement to Georgia Land Trust, hiring a consulting firm
by the name of Forever Forests, LLC (Forever Forests) that specialized
in maximizing the tax benefits, and thus land appraisals, to owners.1 07
The easement conveyed was for the preservation of significant
natural, scenic, and aesthetic values, covering 141.15 acres of the tract. 0 8
However, Belair reserved certain rights in the easement, including forest
management, agricultural activities, recreational activities, and
constructing driveways to connect two designated homesites they had
reserved.109 In contracting with Forever Forests, Belair claimed that the
HBU of the site was a "high-density residential development."" 0 Thus,
the easement reduced the land from a supposed $5.08 million to
$302,000."1 Belair was then advised to omit a portion of Form 8283
relating to the "cost or adjusted basis."1 1 2 Even while Belair circumvented
the appraisal summary, the IRS determined a 40% gross valuation
misstatement, meaning that Belair was liable for 20% valuation penalties
under 26 U.S.C. § 6662."3
In this case, Belair had raised the price of land from $2,605 per acre
to $35,990 per acre for a total valuation of $5,080,000."4 Such a gross
misstatement of value assumes that the land had increased in value by
1,380% during the worst real estate crisis and economic instability since
the Great Depression." 5 The memorandum stated that Belair's refusal to
comply with Form 8283 circumvents the IRS's efficiency in identifying
overvalued property." 6 Further, the Tax Court recognized that the
subjective nature of valuation causes syndications to "play the audit
lottery," hoping that their appraisals will fall through the cracks as. tax
agents attempt to interpret "hundreds" of pages of documents to
determine valuation method." 7 The Tax Court found that requiring
appraisal summaries will prevent abusive schemes and that valuation is
an "essential tool" used by the IRS to identify these schemes." 8
When a taxpayer claims a charitable contribution deduction for
recently purchased property, a wide gap between cost basis and claimed
106. Id. at 4.

107. Id.
108. Belair Woods, 116 T.C.M. (CCH) 325, at 4-5.
109. Id. at 5.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
26 U.S.C. § 6662 (a), (h).
Belair Woods, 116 T.C.M. (CCH) 325, at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 16-17, 20.
Id. at 17-19.
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value raises a red flag, suggesting that the return merits examination. 119
Unless the taxpayer discloses their cost basis and the date and manner of
acquiring the property, thereby complying with the regulatory
requirements, the IRS will be deprived of an essential tool that Congress
intended it to have.1 2 0
While the findings in Belair Woods may seem a promising tool for
attacking syndicated conservation easements, the holding is substantially
limited by its procedural posture. As a Tax Court Memorandum, the
holding is persuasive, but not, necessarily binding on the Tax Court.1 2 1
Additionally, there was doubt as to whether Belair Woods relied on the
opinions of Forever Forest as a competent and independent tax advisor,
so no actual penalty was levied or evaluated against them as a means of
deterrence. 12 Yet, the persuasive holding of Belair Woods cannot be
understated, as it emphasizes just how important valuation is, and
therefore how much power appraisers have, in the continuance of abusive
syndicated conservation easements. In recognizing Belair's omitted
appraisal summary, the Tax Court recognized that inflated valuations of
donated property have been increasingly exploited by tax shelter
promoters.1 23 Thus, the discussion of policy opines for strict reporting
requirements as a method to curb overvaluations.
B. United States v. EcoVest Capital Inc.1 2 4
Two months after the Tax Court announced its ruling in Belair Woods,
the DOJ filed an official complaint against Nancy Zak (the organizer of
the syndication), Claud Clark III (a runaway appraiser), and other
promoters, partners, and syndicators for EcoVest Capital Inc. (the
partnership at issue) for organizing, promoting, or selling an allegedly
abusive conservation easement syndication tax scheme.'12 Unlike Belair
Woods, UnitedStates v. Eco Vest CapitalInc. represents an attempt by the
DOJ to effectively shut down a syndicated conservation easement and its
complicit appraisers.
The initial complaint alleged that the defendants led a syndicated
easement scheme that amounted to the sale of grossly overvalued federal
tax deductions under the guise of an investing partnership.1 26 While much
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 17; see generally Kaufman v. C.I.R., 784 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2015).
Belair Woods, 116 T.C.M. (CCH) 325, at 17.
Blau v. Comm'r, 924 F.3d 1261, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
See Belair Woods, 2018 WL 4523228, at 24.
Id. at 16-17.
No. 1:18-cv-05774-AT (N.D. Ga. Dec. 18, 2018).

125. Justice Department Sues to Shut Down Promoters of Conservation Easement Tax
DEP'T OF JUST. (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.justice
.gov/opa/pr/j ustice-department-sues-shut-down-promoters-conservation-easement-tax-scheme-

Scheme Operating Out of Georgia, U.S.

operating-out [https://perma.cc/G24N-84TX].
126. Complaint, supra note 9, at 12.
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of the complaint relates to the tax theft of syndication, the DOJ does
mention that part of the harm is that syndication "undermines the public's
confidence in a deduction designed to encourage preservation and
conservation efforts that is instead being abused to financially benefit
Defendants." 12 7
Yet, unlike Belair Woods, the DOJ takes special notice of the runaway
appraiser's conduct, citing that Clark had reaped financial gain for the
participation in at least fifty-eight conservation easements syndicates.1 2 8
While Clark routinely ignored comparable sales and relied on
inappropriate methodologies, he also reached the unreasonable
determination that the HBU of a property was a multi-family resort-like
development. 129 In this case, Clark specifically omitted a previous
purchase agreement that valued the property at $1,092,000 and
subsequently overvalued the HBU at $39,697,000.130 While defendants
admit Clark provided appraisals, they repeatedly stated that his methods
comply with statutory appraisal standards. 13 ' In fact, the defendants
submitted a 130-page response and counterclaim denying the inflated
appraisals and accusing the IRS of making "unlawful disclosures" of
appraisal information.1 3 2 Yet, the DOJ alleges that Clark's appraisal
standard falls far below appraisal standards and, in light of his experience,
violates the professional obligations of real estate appraisal.1 3 3
Since there is no direct statutory mechanism to prosecute a syndicated
conservation easement, the DOJ has employed a variety of existing tax
statutes related to abusive tax shelters. 3 4 First, the DOJ is seeking
injunctive relief against the syndication for conduct promoting an abusive
tax shelter within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 6700.135 Additionally, the
syndication is alleged to have interfered substantially with the
administration and enforcement of the internal revenue laws causing over
1.8 billion dollars of overvalued and improper charitable contribution
deductions, and thus liable under 26 U.S.C. § 7402.136 It seems the DOJ
took the stance that a combination of penalties and injunctive relief is the
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at ¶ 169.
Id. at ¶23.
Id. at 1191, 108.
Id. at ¶¶ 107, 108(b).

131. Answer at

11

101, 102, United States v. EcoVest Capital Inc., No. 1:18-cv-05774-AT

(N.D. Ga. Dec. 18, 2018).
132. See Peter Elkind, The IRS Tried to Crack Down on Rich People Using an "Abusive"
Tax Deduction. It Hasn't Gone So Well., PROPUBLtCA (Jan. 3, 2020, 5 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-irs-tried-to-crack-down-on-rich-people-using-an-abusivetax-deduction-it-hasnt-gone-so-well [https://perma.cc/VE82-PNWF].
133. Complaint, supra note 9, at ¶¶ 153, 154.

134. Id. at ¶¶ 175-227.
135. Id. at 1175; 26 U.S.C. § 6700; 26 U.S.C. § 7408.
136. Complaint, supra note 9, at 1 214; 26 U.S.C. § 7402.
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most appropriate way to curb and deter such schemes, otherwise the
defendants would be "likely to continue to promote this conservation
easement syndication scheme."1 37
Thus, it is not surprising that the DOJ also asked for additional
injunctions and penalties against the organizer and appraiser in their
individual capacities. 13 8 For instance, 26 U.S.C. § 6695A(a) imposes a
civil penalty on any appraiser, like Clark, who reasonably knows that the
claimed value of an appraisal would be used in connection with a
deduction and results in a substantial or gross valuation misstatement. 139
An injunction against Clark under 26 U.S.C. § 7402 is appropriate to
prevent recurrence of such conduct.1 40 In addition, Clark may be liable as
a "tax return preparer" for his role in furnishing the Form 8283.141
Specifically, he would be liable because he has vocally and consistently
engaged in overvaluation causing irrevocable harm to the United
States.1 4 2 This is a marked difference from the IRS past treatment of Clark
as a tax professional. 143
While the DOJ has requested injunctive relief and penalties, it has also
requested the repayment of ill-gotten gains that investors would not have
received but for the overvalued easements and corresponding improper
tax benefits."14 Under 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a), the gross receipts that the
defendants received for their participation in the conservation easement
syndication scheme should be repaid to the United States.14 5 Thus, by
requesting the equitable and punitive remedy of disgorgement, the DOJ
recognizes that an injunction alone may not completely remedy the
conduct of syndicators.1 46 However, the defendants allege that such a
remedy would violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. 47 Clark specifically alleges that disgorgement in this case
is not deterrent, but compensatory towards the Treasury.1 4 8 Regardless,
such a severe penalty may be necessary to act as a message to other
syndicators.
137. Complaint, supra note 9, at 1 185.

138. Id. at ¶ 191.
139. Id.; 26 U.S.C. § 6695A(a).
140. Complaint, supra note 9, at ¶ 197; 26 U.S.C. § 7402.
141. Id. at ¶ 207.
142. Id. at 11201, 208.
143. Kiva Dunes Conservation, LLC v. C.I.R., 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818 (T.C. 2009), 2009
WL 1748862, at *6 ("We conclude that Mr. Clark's testimony is credible and his assumptions are
reasonable and amply supported by the evidence presented at trial and in his report.").

144. Complaint, supra note 9, at 1226.
145. Id. at ¶227.
146. See S.E.C. v. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 760 (N.D. Ga.
1983).
147. Claud Clark's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to His Motion to Dismiss at 55, United
States v. EcoVest Capital, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-05774-AT (N.D. Ga. Dec. 18, 2018).
148. Id. at 12.
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Yet, despite its aspirational goal in prosecuting syndicated
conservation easements with tools more apt to address tax fraud rather
than environmental concerns, the case has continued to proceed at a
snail's pace through federal court. 14 9 In fact, the case has proceeded for
almost a year without any resolution as to the efficacy of this scheme of
enforcement.1 50 While the individual prosecution of appraisers and
organizers seems promising, it still seems like an expensive method to
curb the spread of syndication overall. In the context of this litigation,
hopefully the threat of disgorgement will be a deterrent, injunctions will
prove effective, and penalties will serve as punishment.
III. THE (POSSIBLE) FALL OF SYNDICATED CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

The IRS has committed to increasing enforcement of syndicated
conservation easements. 151 For example, in its first decision on a
syndicated conservation easement, the U.S. Tax Court fully denied all tax
benefits from a syndicated conservation easement and applied forty
percent gross valuation misstatement and negligence penalties. 5 2 Since
most syndicated conservation easements fail to meet the basic perpetuity
requirement for a charitable deduction, the ruling in TOT Property
Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner153 stopped a syndicated conservation
easement while not directly remedying the problem of syndication.1 54
However, this decision represents the first time the Tax Court has
commented officially on syndicated conservation easements. 155 The
Court devoted considerable discussion to the issue of appraisals in
continuing these schemes. 156 The taxpayer's appraiser claimed a 1.2
million dollar easement valuation, citing the HBU as a "low density,
destination mountain resort residential development."1 57 Yet, IRS
149. See Docket, EcoVest, No. 1:18-CV-05774-AT.
150. Id.
151. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2019-182 (Nov. 12, 2019) ("Every available enforcement
option will be considered, including civil penalties and, where appropriate, criminal investigations

that could lead to a criminal prosecution.").
152. See Order of Service of Transcript (Bench Opinion), TOT Property Holdings, LLC v.

Comm'r, No. 005600-17, 2019 WL 11880554, at 34 (T.C. Nov. 22, 2019).
153. No. 005600-17, 2019 WL 11880554 (T.C. Nov. 22, 2019).
154. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2019-213 (Dec. 20, 2019) ("We are prepared to take each
of these and all other cases being developed by the IRS to trial, although the substance of most
cases can be resolved without trial because the transactions do not meet the basic requirements to
claim the charitable contribution deduction.").

155. No DeductionforConservationEasement not Protectedin Perpetuity, RSCH.
2019 W L 7284153 (Dec. 30, 2019).

INST. AM.,

FED. TAX UPDATE,

156. See Peter J. Reilly, IRS Grinch Ruining Christmas for Syndicated Conservation
Easements,
FORBES
(Dec.
24,
2019,
3:43
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/
sites/petejreilly/2019/12/24/irs-grinch-ruining-christmas-for-syndicated-conservation-easements/

[https://perma.cc/68K2-V5J6].
157. Order of Service of Transcript (Bench Opinion), supra note 152, at 24.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW & PUBLICPOLICY

150

[Vol. 32

appraisers valued the easement at $632,000, citing an HBU of "recreation
and timber revenue." 158 In dismissing the taxpayer's comparable sales
valuation, the Court stated that "all of the supposedly comparable
sales ... put forward were of intended residential developments in
mountainous terrain, or with views of large bodies of water, such as a
lake. The subject property lacks either feature, and we think it is not
conducive to the same use." 159 While the Tax Court denied the deduction
for not fulfilling the perpetuity requirement, the holding signified the first
successful penalty levied against syndicated conservation easements.1 60
The ruling in TOT Property Holdings was hailed as a success by the
IRS, with Commissioner Chuck Rettig announcing the ruling as evidence
of the IRS's commitment to halting abusive conservation easements. 16 1
Commenting directly on the inability of syndicated conservation
easements to survive scrutiny, Commissioner Rettig stated that the IRS
"will not stop in [their] coordinated pursuit of these abusive transactions
while seeking the imposition of all available civil penalties and, when
appropriate, various criminal options for those involved." 162 Moreover,
Commissioner Rettig announced that IRS "innovation labs" are currently
developing more extensive enforcement tools that employ advanced
techniques. 163 With around fifty cases pending regarding syndicated
conservation easements, the IRS is taking enforcement entirely into its
own hands. 164
Unfortunately, the IRS has been subject to deep budget cuts, leaving
it with limited resources for the expensive task of disputing appraisals
and prosecuting syndicated conservation easements, which may require
costly expert witnesses. 165 A mere five Tax Court trials that focused on
syndicated conservation easements were concluded in 2019.166
Moreover, efforts by the DOJ to prosecute syndicated conservation
easements have been subject to significant delay and cumbersome filings
that impede efficiency and expediency in bringing about definitive
resolutions. 167 Although the current rhetoric is that the dismantling of
these abusive tax schemes are under control, the delayed litigation and
slow moving wheels of the federal government have drastically impeded
the actual dissolution of syndicated conservation easements.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 25.
160. Id. at 37.
161. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2019-213, supra note 154.

162. Id.
163. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2019-182, supra note 151.
164. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2019-2,13, supra note 154.
165. See Elkind, supra note 46 ("'The IRS is outgunned,' says Steve Small, the former IRS
attorney. 'They don't have the budget or personnel to audit a fraction of these transactions."').

166. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2019-213, supra note 154.
167. See Complaint, supra note 9.
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However, pending legislation in the U.S Senate and House of
Representatives aims to eliminate the ability of syndicators to profit from
the donation of a conservation easement on land held for a short period
of time.1 68 In its current iteration, the Charitable Conservation Easement
Program Integrity Act, as it is titled in both the Senate and House, states:
No amount of such contributions may be taken into account
under this section by any partner of such partnership as a
distributive share of such contributions if the aggregate
amount so taken into account by such partner for the taxable
year would ... exceed 2.5 times such partner's adjusted basis
in such partnership.1 69
Both bills, which are identical, remove the ability to profit from
charitable donations by adding a total limit on tax deductions from
syndicated conservation easements regardless of the total value of the
easement. 17 0 In practice, the bipartisan bill would preserve conservation
by legitimate syndication while placing a cap on bad actors who abuse
the system for inflated deductions. Additionally, the Joint Committee on
Tax has estimated that the legislation would end abusive tax shelters and
generate 6.6 billion dollars in federal revenue.1 7 1 Accordingly, multiple
land conservation organizations and appraisal organizations have
supported the Charitable Conservation Easement Program Integrity Act
as a solution to end the subversion of conservation while still preserving
the valuable incentive that conservation easements represent for
legitimate preservation.1 72
Expectedly, supporters of syndicated conservation easements have
sharply criticized both the Charitable Conservation Easement Program
Integrity Act and the findings of the Joint Committee on Taxation
regarding possible revenue saved by its implementation.1 73 Critics
characterize the bill as "anti-easement," stating that it would only be a
temporary solution because the "disallowance rule" would only apply to
the first three years, ending after the date the investor joins the
168. SeePress Release, Land Tr. All., Land Trust Alliance Applauds Introduction of the
Charitable Conservation Easement Program Integrity Act (Mar. 28, 2019) (on file with author).

169. S. 170, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 1992, 116th Cong. (2019).
170. See Press Release, Land Tr. All., Charitable Conservation Easement Program Integrity
Act Expected to Generate $6.6 Billion in Federal Revenue (July 11, 2019) (on file with author).
171. Id.
172. See Land Tr. All., supra note 170 ("Multiple land conservation organizations ... have
endorsed the [Act], including Ducks Unlimited, The Trust for Public Land, The Nature
Conservancy, The Conservation Fund and Pheasants Forever, among others. Additionally, the
Appraisal Institute, ... and the American Society of Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers support

the bill.").
173. Kristen Parillo & Fred Stokeld, Anti-Easement Bill Would Produce Temporary Results,
(July 16, 2019), https://partnershipforconservation.org/antieasement-bill-would-produce-temporary-results-jct-says/ [https://perma.cc/RLU9-SLVX].
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partnership.1 74 Thus, syndicated conservation easements would still be an
attractive tax avoidance mechanism for those who can simply wait out
the holding period.17 5 Critics claim that promoters may even be able to
create "tiered-entity structures to allow future investors to avoid the
disallowance rule."' 76 Moreover, they point out the uncertainty and
variability in the Joint Committee on Taxation's 6.6 billion dollar revenue
generation.1 77 In fact, opponents of the bill express fear that it would
retroactively punish taxpayers who engaged in a syndicated transaction
when they were still legal.'7 8 In response, supporters have argued that the
Notice effectively warned violators that the IRS was looking into
syndication and was likely to pursue enforcement in the near future.' 79
Yet, critics of the bill argue that instead of targeting one class of land
ownership, legislation should focus on "common-sense valuation
solutions."' 80
In fact, valuation and appraisals lie at the heart of the entire issue of
syndicated conservation easements. Without overvalued appraisal of the
easement, the scheme cannot continue. All that is needed to be an
appraiser is an appraisal designation from a recognized professional
organization or the minimum education and experience requirements.181
Traditionally, regulation of real estate appraisers was handled at the state
level through licensing boards, usually through the highest court in the
state, with very little federal oversight.18 2 Yet, in recent years, these
licensing boards have been targeted with additional federal oversight by
the Appraisal Subcommittee (ASC).1 83 The ASC funds the Appraisal
Foundation in their creation of the Uniform Standards of Professional
Appraisal Practice (USPAP), which acts as the definitive set of
guidelines, best practices, and professional standards for the appraisal
practice.1 84 USPAP's authority to define appraisal standards is
unquestionable, as it became the official appraisal standard mandated
under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Parillo & Stokeld, supra note 173.

179. Id.; see I.R.S. Notice 2017-10, supra note 10.

180. Parillo & Stokeld, supra note 173.
181. I.R.C. § 170(f)(1 l)(E)(ii) (2020).
182. EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22953, REGULATION OF REAL ESTATE

APPR AIsERs 1 (2012); John M. Burman, Non-SEC Whistle-Blowing Obligationsof Lawyers Who
Represent Organizations,46 WASHBURN L.J. 127, 152 (2006) ("Historically, lawyers have been

licensed by and subject to the disciplinary authority of state licensing boards (usually the highest
court of the jurisdiction).").

183. MURPHY, supra note 182.
184. Id. at 4.
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of 1989, which required every state to adopt licensing and certification
standards for real estate appraisers. 185 Ultimately, the USPAP acts as the
polestar for how states discipline and regulate appraisers.
The guiding philosophy of the USPAP is for appraisers to "develop
and communicate their analyses, opinions, and conclusions to intended
users of their services in a manner that is meaningful and not
misleading." 186 Accordingly, the USPAP requires that appraisers do
everything to ensure that their valuations do not mislead, which is crucial
to curbing the abuse of overvalued conservation easements.1 87 In fact,
appraisers "must not communicate assignment results with the intent to
mislead or to defraud."1 88 Yet, even questionable appraisers claim that
their overvaluations are in compliance with USPAP.1 89 Thus, the onus
should fall on the state licensing boards to be more vigilant in disciplining
and removing hired gun appraisers by following the USPAP, thereby
nipping overvaluation in the bud.1 90
Although the IRS may sanction any "appraiser who falsely or
fraudulently overstates the value of the contributed property referred to
in a qualified appraisal or appraisal summary ... that the appraiser has
signed," federal regulation has shown to be cumbersome in prosecuting
syndicated conservation easements, especially in the context of
individual appraisers.' 9 ' The scale of this problem may be more easily
remedied through the laboratory of the states. For example, state licensing
boards already have the necessary authority and ability to punish violators
without federal assistance. 192 By revising the USPAP, state licensing
boards would receive guidance, direction, and enforcement tools to
punish runaway appraisers in their jurisdiction, instead of leaving the
entire enterprise to the federal government. One possible revision is for
the USPAP to place additional obligations on any appraiser that works
for a partnership or in the context of conservation easements.
Additionally, the USPAP could devise more specific guidelines for
appraisers who market their services to maximize tax benefits. Additional
185. 12 U.S.C.

§ 3336; 7 C.F.R. §761.7 (2020).

186. THE APPRAISAL FOUND., UNIFORM STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL PRACTICE

1 (2018).
187. Id. at 7, 20, 28, 30, 40, 49.
188. Id. at 7.
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guidelines have already been mandated for other professionals in the
wake of massive fraud.1 93 In the wake of Enron, the passage of section
307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act allowed the SEC to mandate strict
disclosure rules for professionals and lawyers who become aware of
fraud.1 94 Thus, revising the USPAP in this manner is not an
unprecedented solution to syndicated conservation easements and tax
fraud.
Theoretically, working on a state scale with federal oversight,
minimums, or standards by the USPAP would more thoroughly address
the problem, while still allowing the federal government to prosecute
larger scale syndicated conservation easements. Already in the context of
environmental law, the concept of cooperative federalism has been an
important consideration in applying consistent standards while allowing
states to provide additional enforcement.1 95 Cooperative federalism has
been used since the 1930s to define and recognize areas where the federal
and state power overlap.1 96 Instead of stripping power away from states,
responsibility for enforcement is allocated between the state and federal
government.1 97 Although the definition varies, most cooperative
federalist schemes follow a similar formula.' 9 8 An agency, in this case
the IRS or Appraisal Institution, would publish minimum standards of
enforcement of appraisers that preempt state licensing boards.199 Next,
states that wish to pursue their own enforcement, or provide more
stringent localized enforcement in the case of state licensing boards,
would have to be approved by the IRS or alternative government
agency. 200 In the end, the IRS could provide additional oversight
authority and possibly even funding to implement the approved
programs. 2 0 1 Ultimately, the model of cooperative federalism allows for
the states to experiment with enforcement while receiving guidance from
the IRS or from USPAP, thereby curbing conservation easement
exploitation based on the state's unique circumstances. 2 02
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While detractors argue that federal oversight of state enforcement
erodes the concept of self-government, the problem of syndicated
conservation easements cannot be appropriately enforced nationwide
without cooperation from the state level. 203 In addition, legislative reform
and revisions to the appraisal standards of conduct could provide better
tools for the enforcement of the syndicated conservation easement
scheme.204 By pairing specific revised guidance from USPAP for the state
licensing boards with a stronger federal check on syndicated conservation
easements, it is feasible to preserve the lucrative tax benefit of
conservation easements that is relied upon by environmentalists while
curbing the abusive use of syndication that continues to subvert the noble
goals of conservation.
CONCLUSION

IRS Commissioner Rettig recently captured the essential spirit of the
controversy stating "[a]busive syndicated conservation easement
transactions undermine the public's trust in private land conservation and
defraud the government of revenue ... [p]utting an end to these abusive
schemes is a high priority for the IRS." 205 The IRS has shown a
commitment to halting these abusive transactions by prosecuting fraud
and levying heavy penalties on possible violators.
Yet in the words of famed conservationist Aldo Leopold,
"conservation will ultimately boil down to rewarding the private
landowner who conserves the public interest." 206 Essentially, the tax
benefit provided from conservation easements is essential in securing
valuable and unique land to be protected in entirety for generations. Not
all conservation easement holders are bad actors. In fact, they come from
all walks of life and all income levels bound together by their desire for
a guarantee that their land will be protected. 207
However, honest land conservation may be hindered when donors
incentivized by the tax benefit fear IRS action. While the IRS's efforts
have been slow and largely ineffective, they generally focus on the
conduct of the partnerships rather than the appraisals. In truth, the scheme
of syndicated conservation does not exist without appraisers willing to
commit misleading or fraudulent appraisals. While legislation provides a
popular option for targeting the partnerships, critics have revealed
workarounds. 208 Ultimately, it should be the responsibility of the state
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licensing boards to correct overvaluation before it reaches the easement.
In the end, the laboratory of the state paired with a revised USPAP may
have the ability to preserve the value of conservation for donors and
conservationist alike. By creating a model of cooperative federalism that
sets minimum standards, guidance, and oversight of appraisers while
pressing for additional enforcement by the state licensing boards, the
benefit to both income and conservation may be conserved for the future.

